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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses problems created by the annual rankings of law schools
published by US. News & World Report ("US. News"). Of course all unidimensional
rankings of law schools, no matter who produces them, ignore the fact that law schools
have different jobs to do for different students, from preparing those who will serve
under-represented communities to preparing those who will advise major corporations
and the government. Moreover, the consumer orientation of the rankings fails to
recognize that law schools have other roles to perform in society, from devising
improved laws to augmenting the stock of knowledge about law. In addition, there are
serious, particular problems associated with law school rankings-they mislead law
schools and prospective applicants. Law schools are misled in the sense that the
rankings lead them down a path of operation that reduces the quality of schooling they
offer to students. Applicants are misled in the sense that they choose a school that will
improve their lives less than would some other law school. There are a number of
reasons that rankings can mislead applicants, but one source of invalidity worth
highlighting at the outset is that some of the criteria used, such as reputation survey
results, are not reliable measures of quality because they are themselves reflexively
influenced by the US. News rankings.
There are three approaches to improving the rankings. One approach is to use
rankings to create beneficial incentives instead of harmful ones. In this vein, Russell
Korobkin argues that rankings should be constructed to create incentives for the
production of public goods.' The issue of which public goods should be extracted from
law schools deserves further study. Another approach is to attempt to increase the
validity of the rankings. There are experts who have spent their lives studying how to
evaluate educational programs and curricula and one of the first steps in creating valid
rankings ought to be serious consultation with a number of those experts. A third
approach is simply to generate more rankings, ones that emphasize criteria different
from those included in the current rankings.
However, the primary point of this Article is not to prescribe how to create better
rankings, but rather to set forth some reasons not to be complacent, including the
potential harms and omissions of the current rankings, in the hope that competing
rankings published in the future will avoid some of these unintended consequences. It
1. Russell Korobkin, Keynote Address, Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A
Response to Posner and Sunstein, 81 IND. L.J. 35, 44-45 (2006).
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could be argued that this cataloguing of problems is pointless because the market will
eventually correct the harms, if indeed any flow from the publication of rankings.2 The
penultimate part of this Article discusses the question of why the free market might not
solve the problems created by rankings.
Before discussing the harms of rankings, it is critical to distinguish between the data
used to make rankings and the rankings made from the data. This Article does not
argue that any of the information being incorporated into rankings would be better left
unpublished. In the present case, it is plain that much of the data used in law school
rankings may be useful to those considering where to go to school. For example, it
could be extremely helpful for a student to know the Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) scores and grades of other students at the schools being considered. A student
might want to go where the other students are better, worse, or similar in their ability to
take standardized tests. A student might want to go where other students are better,
worse, or similar in their ability to get good grades in undergraduate courses. A student
might do well in an environment where the students are similar in these abilities, or
where they strongly differ. For many such considerations, there is a wealth of
information about law schools easily available on the Web, and U.S. News publications
offer easy access to a few important criteria.
But law school rankings are not presentations of data or other facts. Law school
rankings are opinions. It is the opinion of the editors at U.S. News that Yale is the best
law school. The editors are forthright-unusually and surprisingly forthright-in their
presentation of the mechanical calculations that lead them to their opinion. They have
also been willing to improve the formula by which they determine their opinions. But
none of that elevates the rankings to anything more than opinions.
One other initial caveat is in order. This Article does not attempt to tally the benefits
of rankings. Rankings do provide information, even if it is essentially opinion.
However, the benefits of rankings ought not to be conflated with the benefits of
presenting data in manageable forms. Some might argue that the U.S. News rankings
allow a reader to find a range of schools with a given range of LSAT scores. But
omnibus rankings are not necessary or even helpful for performing that function. That
function is performed by any list of schools ordered by the LSAT scores of the
students. For years, the Ranking Game Web site has allowed users to order law schools
from top to bottom on many criteria: LSAT score, reputation, tuition, bar-passage rate,
etc.3 The U.S. News Web site now also offers viewers the same functionality, allowing
them to rank schools according to some of the criteria it uses in the rankings. These
examples show that law schools can be ranked on individual criteria without those
criteria being hammered into a thin, unidimensional, omnibus ranking.
2. Larry Ribstein has argued that the market will discipline law schools. See Ideoblog,
Dean's Letters (May 9, 2005), http:/ibusmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2005/05/
deans letters.html; Ideoblog, The Market for Academic Control (May 6, 2005),
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2005/05/themarket-for .html; Ideoblog, Symposium on
the Next Generation of Law School Rankings (Mar. 30, 2005), http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2005/03/symposium on th.html.
3. The Ranking Game gets about 30,000 page views per month. Jeffrey E. Stake, The Law
School Ranking Game, http://monoborg.law.indiana.edu/LawRank/index.html (last visited Sept.
5, 2005).
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Notwithstanding that the information embedded in the rankings can be presented in
many other ways, there are still some benefits of omnibus rankings of the sort
published by US. News. Decision makers who lack the ability or time to consider the
importance of a number of factors may make better choices in a world with rankings
than in a world without them. It is likely that some prospective students would, in the
absence of rankings, make errors in weighing the various criteria available to them.
Some salient criteria would take on too much importance if these decision makers were
presented with no more than the underlying data in an easily digested form. These
purchasers of legal education, these lawyers to be, these persons of limited ability to
balance multiple criteria in making an important decision, are saved from their own
mental infirmities when they are presented with a unidimensional, summary calculation
based on weights provided by the ranker.
I. RANKINGS CAN MISLEAD SUPPLIERS OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Many of the stakeholders in legal education, including administrators, students,
alumni, and faculty members, care about the rank of their school in the various
published rankings. If important ranking systems include a given factor, schools will
shift resources to improving that factor and away from factors that count for less in the
rankings. This raises the issue of whether those changes in resource allocation improve
legal education. If there was no systematic bias against an included factor before the
rankings shifted incentives, the rankings push spending on that factor beyond the
optimum. The rankings cause schools to devote too many resources to some goals and
too little to others. According to Dean Kramer of Stanford Law School, "You distort
your policies to preserve your ranking, that's the problem." 4 Here follows a partial list
of incentives created by rankings, especially those published by US. News.
A. Focus More on Grades and Less on Undergraduate Institutions
When Admitting Students
Rankings push law schools to give too much weight to some factors in their
admissions decisions. Perhaps the best example is the weight given to a student's
undergraduate grade point average (UGPA). This factor accounts for 10% of the US.
News rankings. Schools wanting to move up in the rankings will turn down the student
with a 3.4 UGPA in engineering from Rose-Hulman in favor of the applicant with a 3.8
UGPA in shuffleboard from Central Ivy State University. The data from the past seven
years confirm the effect of this incentive. 5 Both the 75th and 25th percentiles have
increased by at least 0.02 UGPA points per school per year, which is significant at the
.001 level (regression 1, see Appendix).
4. Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 4A, at 18
(quoting Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer).
5. It is possible that UGPAs have risen because of grade inflation, although it does not
seem likely that grades have inflated that quickly in recent years. It is also possible, and would
seem to be more likely, that UGPAs have increased because the size of the applicant pool has
increased. And perhaps their qualifications have improved even more than would be expected
solely on the basis of the increase in numbers.
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There is no reason to believe that admissions committees systematically gave grades
too little weight before US. News's rankings changed the law schools' strategies. The
likely consequence is that the US. News incentives have led schools away from the
proper balancing of the many factors that go into determining which applicants will
improve their law schools and will make the best lawyers. Factors such as honesty and
empathy lose weight when grades get more attention. The only factor that has probably
not lost weight in the admissions process is the LSAT, because US. News gives it even
more weight than grades.
The focus on grades has secondary effects that are equally worrisome. A well-
advised student hoping to get into a law school that cares about its ranking will choose
an undergraduate school and courses that have inflated grades over ones with tough
grading. As the importance of the UGPA increases, law aspirants will try to optimize
that credential, to the detriment of their education. Do we want the seats at competitive
law schools to go to those who are good at picking an easy curriculum instead of those
who signed up for a challenging education?
B. Focus on the LSA T
There are two reasons for using the LSAT in law school admissions: it is the best
single predictor of first-year performance, and it can be used to compare English
speaking students from any point on the globe.6 As with grades, the US. News rankings
cause schools to place too much emphasis on the LSAT. Ironically, the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) may have inadvertently played a role in increasing the
weight given to the LSAT. The AALS commissioned a 1998 report which concluded
that virtually all of the differences in overall ranks could be explained by academic
reputation and student selectivity, the latter marked primarily by the median LSAT
score. 7 It found the other ten factors to be "superfluous.,,8 Law schools learned from
this, if they had not figured it out before, that they should place great weight on that
single admissions factor. To make matters worse, the ABA stopped collecting median
LSAT data from schools. It was a predictable consequence of this decision that US.
News would eventually discontinue use of the median because they no longer had a
way to check the accuracy of the medians submitted by the schools. 9 And in fact that
6. The superior predictive power of the LSAT as compared to the UGPA is well
documented. See William D. Henderson, The LSA T, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The
Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEx. L. REv. 975, 1030 (2004)
(citing several validity studies). However, Prof. Henderson's study suggests that the higher
predictive validity of the LSAT may be partially attributable to the prevalence of time-pressured
exams in the law school curriculum, particularly during the first year. Id. at 1030-34 (discussing
mechanics of this relationship).
7. STEPHEN P. KLEIN & LAURA HAMILTON, THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT RANKING OF ABA LAW SCHOOLS (1998), http://www.aals.org/validity.html.
8. Id.
9. I begged the ABA not to stop collecting the median data, but was rebuffed with the
dubious claim that U.S. News's use of the 25th percentile would have no more impact on
admissions than its use of the median.
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was the reason given by U.S. News when it made that change from the median to a
combination of the 25th and 75th percentiles for the 2005 ranking.
10
U.S. News's publication of the 25th percentile and, more important, its use of that
figure in its ranking formula means that a school wanting to maximize its rank should
maximize its 25th percentile LSAT. Another way of saying this is that competitive
schools will maximize the LSAT for 75% of their incoming "one-L" class. Some law
schools have already succumbed to this temptation and today place great weight on the
LSAT, considerably more weight than before rankings were regularly published. The
result of this attention has been a yearly increase of 0.220 in the 75th percentile LSAT
(p <.005), a number which is relatively difficult for schools to increase, ' and a larger
0.467 yearly increase in the 25th percentile (p < .001) during the seven years after the
ABA stopped collecting the LSAT medians (regression 112).13 In the world of law
school admissions, staying in place has meant falling behind.
Because the LSAT and UGPA are far from perfectly correlated, maximizing one
does not maximize the other. If a school wishes to maximize its medians on both the
LSAT and UGPA, it will have to admit nearly all of its class on the basis of those two
numbers. When schools put that much weight on the LSAT and UGPA, something has
to give. This increased attention to those two criteria necessarily comes at the expense
of other criteria that do not count in the U.S. News rankings. Those unranked criteria
include honesty, integrity, gumption, creativity, and other aspects of fitness to practice
as a lawyer.
Professors Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck have made a systematic study of the
activities of good lawyers. By interviewing lawyers, faculty, students, judges, and
clients, they identified twenty-six factors that are important for effective lawyering.
Their list includes practical judgment, creativity and innovation, passion and
engagement, ability to see the world through the eyes of others, networking and
business development, diligence, integrity and honesty.14 Neither the LSAT nor the
UGPA tells the extent to which a person has these qualities. For every applicant
admitted on the basis of his LSAT or UGPA, the law school must admit one fewer
applicant on the basis of such other indicators of merit.
Each law school admissions committee should be free to attach what weight it
considers to be appropriate to all of an applicant's indices of promise for future
10. "'We wanted to go with verifiable data,' Mr. Morse says, 'and we heard that some
schools weren't computing their median correctly."' Wellen, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting U.S.
News Editor Robert Morse). See also Carl Bialik, Small Change by U.S. News Leads To New
Controversy in Rankings, WALL ST. J. ONLrNE, April 7, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/
(subscription required) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
11. Most law schools would have accepted most applicants with LSAT scores above their
75th percentile even before the U.S. News rankings were published. For that reason, there is not
much a school can do through admissions decisions alone to increase its 75th percentile on the
LSAT.
12. See infra Appendix.
13. It is possible that LSATs have increased because of an increase in the pool of qualified
applicants to law schools.
14. Marjorie M. Shultz, Expanding the Definition of Merit, BOALT HALL TRANSCRiPT,
Summer 2005, at 25, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/alumni/transcript/summer_
05/22-27feat23Isat final.pdf.
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contributions as law students and practitioners, without any special concern for how the
admission of that student would influence its school's rank in US. News. But
committees are constrained. The effect of US. News rankings on the law school market
is similar to that of a command and control economy, with the resulting loss in
experimentation and other benefits of decentralized decision making. Rather than 180
different schools deciding independently how much weight to give these two numbers
in their attempts to attract and cater to different segments of the market, US. News
commands all schools that care about their rank to use LSAT score and UGPA as the
key, essentially exclusive, indicia of student quality.
Law school admissions are decisions with large societal implications. If we were to
ask the American public, do you want lawyers in the future to have more cleverness or
more integrity, which would they choose? If they would choose integrity, schools are
sacrificing the traits the public wants in the quest for higher U.S. News rankings. What
characteristics should a defendant want in his lawyer when his life is on the line in a
capital case? What qualities should citizens want in an official making policy for the
government? These are not the attributes being selected for when schools reserve most
of their seats for those who are tops in bubble ability, the skill at taking multiple-choice
standardized exams. The public interest is not well served when lawyers are those who
are good at taking such tests rather than those who are good at written and oral
expression. The nation is not strengthened when law schools deemphasize quality of
undergraduate school, rigor of courses taken, business and military experience, social
intelligence, and interpersonal skills. The effect of US. News rankings is to give the
admissions edge to the applicant with a 163 LSAT who partied hard throughout college
over the applicant with a 161 who spent a few years as a soldier and then started a
successful business before taking the LSAT. As the influence of US. News reaches
deeper into the admissions process, service to the country through the Marines or
Peace Corps, ability to communicate orally with actual human beings, empathy, and a
sense ofjustice will all be forsaken in the pursuit of higher numbers.
The costs of misguided admissions processes are not limited to the world of
professional lawyers. Many graduates use their legal educations in non-legal
occupations. Law school has become a sort of general education, widely recognized as
useful in many positions of leadership within both the public and private sectors. If law
schools are admitting the wrong students, the effects may be broadly felt.
There are many indicators of quality in the files of applicants, but US. News creates
an incentive to ignore them all in favor of the LSAT and UGPA. However, this is not
inevitable. Rankings could continue to employ LSAT and UGPA data without causing
schools to focus entirely on those criteria. US. News could use each school's 75th
percentiles on the LSAT and UGPA as its measures of student quality rather than
including the medians or 25th percentiles in the ranking formula.15 This change would
reduce the effects of rankings on admissions practices because maximizing a class's
75th percentile on any criterion can be done with one-half as many students as it takes
to maximize the median and only one-third as many students as it takes to maximize
the 25th percentile. For a school to maximize its 75th percentiles on both the LSAT
15. I have made this request to U.S. News both privately and publicly. See Jeffrey E. Stake,
Reducing the Impact ofRankings on Law School Admissions: A Proposal, JURIST, Feb. 4,2003,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew93.php. The editor, however, does not seem eager to
acknowledge that U.S. News influences the behavior of law schools.
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and UGPA, it would need to admit no more than one-half of the class by the LSAT and
UGPA. Thus, the proposed change would cut in half the portion of the class admitted
solely on those numbers, leaving much more discretion with the admissions personnel
at each school to admit the students they think will make the greatest contributions as
law students and lawyers.' 6 Each school would have more freedom than is currently
allowed to make its own determination of which students it wishes to admit without
worrying about how those decisions will affect its rank in US. News.
1 7
Were this proposal adopted, there would still be a fight over students, and it would
be a fight over a smaller pool of students, but each school would need fewer students to
make its goal. Because the fight would be over a smaller pool, many students would
get large tuition breaks; indeed, many would be offered a full ride. In some ways, this
would make the 75th percentile LSAT an even better indicator of school quality.
Tuition differences would be wiped out and students would choose among full-ride
offers based on other factors. Students' choices would be better measures of their
perceptions of quality than when they are influenced by cost considerations. This could
have another benefit: more students would get complete scholarships than under the
current system. Prospective students would have to be in a school's top 25% to qualify,
but many students would be in the top quarter at some school. Since more students
would be able to attend for free, more students from the lower economic strata would
have an opportunity to attend law school.
Some might argue that a single statistic, the 75th percentile, does not give an
accurate picture of student quality. At one time in the past, that might have been true
because schools were not so focused on the UGPA and LSAT. But now they are, and
what was once a description is now a prescription for success in the rankings. Many
schools have striven to increase both percentiles. What will happen if U.S. News
switches to using just the 75th percentile on the LSAT and UGPA? The switch will
make almost no difference to the ranks of schools. In the short run, there is little
difference between who will win the competition by the 75th percentile LSAT or a
combination of the 75th and 25th because the two figures tell the same story. Using
U.S. News's 2004 data, the correlation between the 75th percentile LSAT and the
average of the 75th and 25th for all schools is .991. So, although the switch would not
16. To some extent the example above understates the benefits of changing to the 75th
percentiles. Even before US. News published its rankings, many schools rejected few of the
applicants with LSAT scores above the school's 75th percentile. Thus, rankings based on the
75th percentile LSAT would have a negligible effect on who is admitted to a given law school.
By contrast, rankings based on the median LSAT (to say nothing of the 25th percentile) create
an incentive for schools to admit dozens of students in the middle of the class who would
otherwise be rejected in favor of applicants with slightly inferior numbers but with more
promise as lawyers. Thus a shift to the 75th percentile on the LSAT and UGPA could cut the
number of students admitted primarily on the numbers by well more than half.
17. The result might be similar to the results one would get with the tournament system
suggested by Christopher Avery, Mark Glickman, Caroline Hoxby, & Andrew Metrick, A
Revealed Preference Ranking of US. Colleges and Universities, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10803, 2004), available athttp://www.nber.org/papersW10803.
The idea common to both methods of ranking is that students' matriculation decisions determine
a winner of many head-to-head contests. Because students know that law school admissions are
driven heavily by LSAT and UGPA numbers, a decision to attend a school is effectively a
decision not to attend all schools with lower LSAT and UGPA medians.
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affect the ranks of the schools, it would allow schools more freedom to admit students
with low numbers. In the long run, some schools would probably make use of this new
freedom, and their 25th percentile numbers would decrease. Of course, the 25th
percentiles for the schools would continue to be published, so the question is not
whether the public would lose information. Rather, the question is whether it is
somehow illegitimate for US. News to ignore that decrease and leave the schools
where they are in the rankings. Since the schools are taking students that they think will
improve the school or make better lawyers than the applicants with higher numbers that
they rejected, it is legitimate to consider the student body to be just as strong as it
would have been if the committee had competed with other schools solely on the basis
of the numbers.
The point of this proposal is not to eliminate the LSAT from the admissions
process, nor even to dethrone it from its seat as the primary factor for many files. The
point is to let schools use the LSAT as they see fit. With only a minuscule effect on its
ranks, the change by US. News to using only the 75th percentiles on LSAT and UGPA
could dramatically reduce the harmful long-term effects of rankings on law school
admissions.'
8
Another alternative that would decrease the impact of the rankings on admissions
would be for U.S. News to change the ranking criteria from the LSAT and UGPA
medians to the median of an index that combines the two. However, because US. News
needs a verifiable number for its rankings, this can only occur if the Law School
Admission Council constructs a single index score for each student. As an
administrative matter, this would be a trivial task. Of course, the ABA would also have
to require that each school report its median index score.
Currently under consideration is another proposal aimed at preventing US. News
rankings from causing schools to overweight the LSAT in admissions. The idea is to
replace the current LSAT scores with scores that are scaled separately for each school.
There are at least two problems with such a maneuver. First, placing each school on a
different scale would make it much more difficult for students to gauge their chances of
admission to any school. Second, unless the same were done for grades, US. News
might simply put all of the weight on the UGPA, exacerbating the undesireable
incentives and educational consequences noted above.
C. Tweak Other Aspects of the Admissions Process to Increase Numbers
There are a number of other admissions changes a school can make to increase its
rank according to US. News. Below are some of them. None has been shown to
improve law education; more likely, they would degrade it.
18. After this proposal was presented at the Symposium on The Next Generation of Law
School Rankings, Dean Robel of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington gathered
signatures from sixty law deans on a letter asking the ABA to return to collecting the median
data. The ABA has decided to collect the median LSAT and UGPA from each school and, as
expected, U.S. News has announced that it will revert to its former use of the medians. Given
that change, which will take pressure off the 25th percentiles (which will probably decrease as a
result), the benefits of the proposed change to the 75th percentiles would be less dramatic, but
would still be considerable.
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1. Admit Fewer "One-L" Students and Allow More Transfer Students
The importance of LSATs and UGPAs to a school's rank has created an incentive
for schools to reduce the size of the first-year class. With a smaller class it is easier to
achieve a high median. To maintain revenues, however, a school reducing the size of
the one-L class will need to increase the number of transfer students. This possibility is
troubling. There is almost no conceivable benefit to the students who have to start at
one school and then move from that school to a preferred school. There is clearly no
benefit to the schools losing their more successful students. Aside from increasing
ranks, there is also negligible benefit to the schools to which the transfer students are
moving. Although schools may argue that transfer students have proved themselves
worthy, which they have, if there were a substantial net benefit to the importing schools
from skimming large numbers of second-year students from other schools, law schools
would have had extensive transfer programs in the past.
Not only is there little benefit to the receiving school, there is a pedagogical cost.
Although the lists of first-year courses are similar from campus to campus, any law
school worth a high rating will be striving for an integrity of program across the years.
Students who have not taken a school's first-year curriculum may learn less in
subsequent years and may contribute less to the learning of other students in their
classes. A responsible teacher cannot assume that transfer students have been exposed
to the basic conceptual building blocks taught in the one-L curriculum. The teacher has
to either cover that material again, to the detriment of the students who have been
through it, or push on in spite of the fact that some of the students are not prepared, to
the detriment of the transfer students.
If this incentive takes hold, average class size will change. The first-year class will
become smaller, compared to graduation class size or school size, at those schools to
which students want to transfer. A lagged, opposite reaction might appear in the
schools from which they move to make up for the students lost through the transfer
process. The net effect will not be positive for the students in either group of schools.
2. Reject Some Students with High LSAT Scores
Of the students a school accepts, it is hardest to matriculate those with the highest
LSAT scores. Admitting a student with a high LSAT score means admitting a student
likely to reject the offer of admission. If "yield" or "acceptance ratio" is a factor in the
rankings, as it has been in the U.S. News rankings, a school might improve its ranking
by rejecting these students. This practice would clearly not be in the interest of the
rejected student, and most faculty members would think it does not further the
educational mission of a school to reject those applicants with high scores simply
because of those high scores. Of course, the LSAT is also a factor in the rankings, so
schools will not take this practice so far that they accept just the lowest LSAT
candidates. A school maximizing its ranking will reject only those students that are
unlikely to accept, the ones with the highest LSAT scores. One way for schools to do
this is to interview those students with the highest LSAT scores and accept only those
who declare they will matriculate. This process will waste time and could result in
students being inappropriately denied admission.
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3. Reject Students with Limited Prospects for Employment
If one of the ranking criteria is employment rates, as it has been for U.S. News, a
school can improve its ranking by accepting only those applicants who appear to be
employable. One way to do this is to inquire as to whether the applicant has contacts in
the business or law world, so that she will be likely to get a job regardless of
performance in law school. Of course, favoring applicants with "old-boy" connections
operates to the disadvantage of those from underprivileged backgrounds. Such
favoritism also operates to the disadvantage of the educational program of the school
when those that are displaced would have made more useful additions to the class.
4. Focus Scholarship Money on Applicants with
LSAT Scores Just Above the Median
A scholarship dollar given to one student is a dollar not available to others. In the
past, most schools have offered substantial aid to some top students. Since, at most
schools, a student with an LSAT score of 177 is half as useful in improving the
school's median LSAT as two students with LSAT scores of 168, it would be better to
offer two half-sized scholarships to two students with LSAT scores of 168 instead of
one full-sized scholarship to a student with a 177 LSAT score. The effect of this could
be to draw into the profession fewer of the students with the very highest LSAT scores,
by reducing the number of full rides that are available. Notice that the schools that once
offered a full ride to the students with an LSAT score of 168 might also switch to
offering half a scholarship to two students with LSAT scores of 163. There are
countervailing effects here, and the situation is complex, but it is not clear that any of
those effects on the supply of talented lawyers are being considered in the struggle to
increase ranks.
D. Start a Part-Time Program
Since only full-time students are included in the LSAT or UGPA figures, it
behooves a school to start a part-time program and fill it with the matriculants having
the lowest admissions numbers. Once again, there is little benefit for the student and
not much in it for the school aside from the boost to its rank.
E. Focus the Curriculum on What Is Needed for Bar Passage
Setting aside, for the moment, whether bar passage is a valid measure of school
quality, there is no doubt that many schools are paying more attention to it than they
did in the past. And bar passage rates may be rising. That is not necessarily a good
sign. If there were reason to believe that schools gave too little attention to lessons
oriented toward bar passage, improved bar passage could signal an improvement in the
curriculum. But there is no reason for such an assumption. Indeed, increasing the
relative amount of attention schools pay to bar passage will redound to the detriment of
students.
Will teachers teach better if they are told by their seniors and the administration that
it is critically important that no one fail the bar on their subject? Teachers that care to
please their seniors and the dean will dumb down the essentials so they can be
comprehended and retained by the weakest students. They need not worry about the
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upper portion of the class (from the upper third to the upper 90%, depending on the
school) because those students will pass the bar anyway. Teachers concerned primarily
with bar passage will teach to the bottom of the class to assure that no student is left
behind. Perhaps this would work an improvement. But if so, why have teachers not
adopted this strategy already? Would an informed student prefer to attend the school
where the teachers are trying hardest to make sure no one fails the bar exam? It is not
clear that leaving no law student behind is the best pedagogical policy. This is not to
say that schools should not devote resources to helping all students leap the bar. But it
is clear that rankings put pressure on schools to change their curriculum in ways that
will not produce a net gain. Moreover, if the dumbing down the lessons is successful,
bar examiners might respond by raising the cut score for passage and, if they do,
schools will be under pressure to devote even more time to bar passage and less to
teaching important knowledge and skills. The result could well be a detrimental change
in the curriculum, without any increase in overall bar passage.
Focusing on bar passage creates another problematic incentive. An admissions
committee can help the school on this criterion by rejecting students that are less likely
to pass the bar. For example, some students hail from states with difficult bars, such as
New Hampshire, California, West Virginia, Alabama, Maine, Maryland, Virginia, and
New Jersey. If they are likely to return to their home states to practice, all else equal, a
school will be better off rejecting them in favor of students from states with an easy
bar. More generally, as noted above, there are many characteristics that are important
to building a good lawyer. When bar passage is a factor in the rankings, schools have
an incentive to ignore those characteristics in favor of ones that increase the chances
the student will pass his or her first bar exam. Should a school deny admission to
Mother Teresa if it predicts that she might not pass a bar exam until her second try?
F. Spend Money on Glossy, Colorful Advertising
Since the single largest factor in the US. News rankings is the reputation among
legal academics, schools seeking to raise their reputations have started spending
substantial sums on glossy promotional publications and mailing them to legal
academics and practicing lawyers. According to one law dean, "Tons of money-not
just here, but at other law schools around the country-is being spent on public
relations now that was never spent before."' 19 A few years ago, one school hoping to
make a splash sent a large and colorful poster with a marine motif to all law professors
at Indiana University-Bloomington, and presumably many other law schools. Setting
aside whether such tactics sacrifice long-run interests for gains that will show up during
a dean's tenure, it is doubtful that attempts to increase the "visibility" of schools will
advance the legal well-being of society.
G. Raise Tuition for All, but Increase Scholarships for Those with Numbers
Since having more resources matters to US. News, it is in the interest of a school to
raise tuition and give much of it back to the students in the form of scholarships. Thus,
19. Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of
Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205, 211 (2006).
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by an accounting change, a school can raise its rank without changing the economics of
the relationships between the school and its students. But schools might not stop there.
Once tuition has been raised, schools could decide that the scholarships need not be
granted equally to all students. They could be used to help those who lack financial
resources, but if that were the goal it would have been done already. Instead, the school
will recognize that the new revenues could be used to attract those with high LSAT and
UGPA numbers. One unwelcome side effect would be a reduction in access to legal
education for persons of limited financial means.
H. Pay Your Own Utilities
Other accounting practices can make a similar difference to a school's rank in US.
News. At some schools, the university provides the electricity to the law school and
deducts the cost from the tuition paid by the law students.20 The school never sees the
money, and it is not part of its resources. Such schools could increase the resources
reported to US. News by collecting the tuition directly from the students and paying
the university for the electricity and other services provided by the university.
L Encourage Everyone and Her Sister to Apply
Since it may be important to have a high rejection ratio, it is important to get every
possible applicant to apply for admission. This includes students that have no chance
of being accepted. It may be necessary to waive the application fee, but that financial
cost could be worth the gains in rank, especially since some of those applicants would
not have applied if they had been required to pay a fee. Once applications are up, it
becomes even more important to sift them out using the numbers because it is
expensive to have committee members study stacks of applications looking for the
gems.
J. Hire Your Own
When nine months after graduation rolls around, a school should check to see
whether there are any unemployed graduates and hire them so that its employment
numbers, which count for a lot in the US. News rankings, look good.
K. Make It Difficult for Faculty Members to Leave in the Fall
To increase the faculty/student ratio, all possible faculty members must be counted.
According to the reporting rules, they are counted in the fall semester. So, schools
maximizing their rank could make it difficult for faculty members to leave in the fall.
Sabbaticals and other extended leaves will be taken primarily in the spring. This may
have the effect of leaving students with too few spring options for learning experiences.
If there were no such seasonal incentive created by US. News, faculty leaves could be
divided more or less evenly across the fall and spring semesters, giving students a more
useful distribution of courses.
20. Wellen, supra note 4, at 18.
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It appears that this tactic might not work in the future. Since the ABA has now
decided to collect spring faculty counts in addition to the fall counts and U.S. News
will use both in an annualized approach, there will be no advantage to allowing faculty
members to take leaves only in the spring. The fact that some schools had more faculty
members teaching in the fall than in the spring suggests that schools were paying close
attention to the incentives created by U.S. News. If the balance shifts toward the spring
in future years, that will be some evidence that schools were heeding the incentive to
have an unbalanced faculty.
L. Increase the Number of "Books" in the "Library"
Libraries are expensive. But not all books are. A school wanting to move up in rank
could buy a truckload of cheap books and put them in an "off-site" library annex. If the
reporting authorities wise up and require them to be "on-site," schools may stick the
books in the basement or attic. Will this increase the net social welfare? Storage space
may be cheap, but it is not free and this would be a waste of that resource, as well as an
attempt to mislead the public about the quality of the school.
M. Decrease Funding for the Library and Other Units with an
Abnormally High Proportion of Positive Externalities
U.S. News creates incentives for schools not to spend too much on library resources.
For example, given that the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington's ("IU-
B") law library is ranked above the IU-B Law School, IU-B may be spending too
much on its library. This conclusion is not based on a fair appraisal of the value of a
great library to the students or faculty, or to the people of the state of Indiana for that
matter. Instead, this conclusion reflects the fact that the money spent on the library
could give IU-B a better bump in rank if spent on other factors, such as tutorials for
students who might not pass the bar. This would clearly be the wrong way to decide
how much to spend on a law library. But this is what US. News, in effect, tells IU-B to
do to maintain or improve its position. On the other hand, because library volumes are
a factor, US. News also creates an incentive not to spend too little on the library.
II. GENERAL EFFECTS
A. U.S. News Rankings Could Homogenize Legal Education
This point about library resources, that a school needs to get the library budget just
right, neither spending too much nor too little, applies to other criteria as well. One
effect of the hegemony of the US. News rankings is to create an incentive for schools
to calculate and aim for an optimal mix of expenditures. What this means is that US.
News may unwittingly be homogenizing legal education. With time, schools will learn
which spending mix yields the greatest rankings bang and the optimum mix will tend to
be the same for most schools. US. News will make it increasingly hard to experiment
with different ways of producing an extraordinary product.
A corollary of this homogenization effect is that schools will find it unrewarding to
seek a market niche. The US. News formula discourages diversity and specialization in
curricula. For example, a six-hour quantitative methods course of the type once
required of first-year students at George Mason could discourage applicants. This
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could narrow the appeal of the school, which would in turn decrease its LSAT index. It
is discouraging to imagine that future instructional innovations might not be
implemented because of concerns about the effect on a school's rank in US. News.
Creatively tailored programs could certainly improve some law schools' offerings to
students and society, yet it will be a rare school in the upper half that will take the risk
of radical innovation or narrow specialization. Law schools are in danger of losing the
freedom to create first-class products for the needs of varying consumers and
stakeholders.
It could be argued that rankings of law schools will not homogenize legal education
any more than the ranking of cars by Consumer Reports homogenizes automobile
production. But the markets are not the same because car buyers are more able to think
and evaluate for themselves. First, car buyers can take a meaningful test drive. A day in
the classroom does not give prospective students much of an idea of what it will be like
to buy an education from a school. Second, automobile consumers can easily see that
factors like handling, acceleration, size, or gas mileage might be more important to
them than to Consumer Reports testers; law prospects are less able to re-evaluate the
weights US. News attaches to its criteria. 21 Third, consumers in the auto market are
repeat players and can learn from previous experiences, while no one buys two J.D.s.
Fourth, Consumer Reports does not have nearly as much influence on the ultimate
value of the product being purchased as US. News has on the market value of a law
degree. Although car buyers might wish to resell the car in the future, those sales are a
relatively small factor in selection. Law students buy a product that they will resell at
many points in the future, and that resale value is a much larger portion of what they
are paying for. Because law students do not expect to drive their degrees into the
ground, they cannot afford to ignore the predictions of future market value. For these
reasons, rankings of law programs have more power than other rankings to homogenize
their products.
If US. News changed the weights in accordance with the advice of a different panel
each year, the rankings would be less likely to homogenize law schools. This would
also reduce the sense that the rankings actually reflect a true order of quality, which
might encourage consumers to place their own weights on the various factors instead of
unquestioningly following US. News. This might be good for US. News too, as there
would be some reason to buy the new issue instead of relying on the ranking from the
previous year.
US. News has created a prisoner's dilemma. Each school will rank higher if it
defers to US. News. But all schools will be worse off for that deference. All schools
are trying to matriculate the students with high LSAT scores, but the pool of students is
not improved. Many schools will end up with smaller first year classes, but more
students will have to switch schools part way through their education. All schools will
teach to the bar exam, and curricular integrity will diminish. Schools will have an
"optimal" library, with fewer expensive books and more donated ones. And for all this,
most schools will stay put in the rankings. There can be no net gain for schools as a
whole since for every rank step ascended another school must drop a rank. Eventually,
21. It is also possible that readers of Consumer Reports agree more with the underlying
criteria being used to rank cars than readers, at least faculty readers, of U.S. News agree with the
criteria being used to rank schools.
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law schools may follow the strategems of football coaches, but no one will be better
served-neither students nor the society that awaits their services.
B. U.S. News is Stratifying Law Schools by LSAT
Many schools have tried to increase their 75th and 25th percentiles on the LSAT. At
the same time, students have been influenced by U.S. News in choosing schools. If
schools want the highest LSAT scores they can get, they will deny admission to those
with scores below the 25th percentile, or the median if that is the critical number. If
students choose the highest-ranked schools among those that accept them, they will
tend to apply to and attend the school with the highest LSAT numbers, since that
correlates highly with the overall ranks. Given these tendencies, over time, the range of
student LSAT scores to be found at any school should narrow and there will be an
increasing stratification of schools by LSAT score.22 Indeed, this appears to have
occurred. When the difference between LSAT 75th percentile and LSAT 25th
percentile was regressed on the year, the year was a significant predictor (p < .00 1).
Over the past seven years, the gap has shrunk by one-fourth of an LSAT point per year
(regression 1).
Whether this is good or bad is open to debate. It reduces the diversity of LSAT
scores in the classroom, making it less likely that students will learn how to negotiate
with and make arguments to lawyers who differ in whatever abilities it is that the LSAT
measures. If the LSAT does not measure much of importance, this reduction of LSAT
ability is not important. But if the LSAT does measure an important difference,
classroom uniformity might be detrimental to student learning. This stratification will
also exacerbate the LSAT differences between the majority and the students admitted
to achieve other sorts of diversity. In the past, the diversity students' LSAT scores
blended into the wide range of LSAT scores in the class. As the variation on the LSAT
within a school decreases, the LSATs of diversity students will be more noticeably
different. On the other hand, some might argue that teaching is more efficient when all
students have similar LSAT scores, although there is no formal study supporting this
view. Setting aside the issue of whether the stratification is good or bad, it could be
argued that by pushing schools to matriculate a narrower band of students, the U.S.
News rankings have encroached upon one of the 'four essential freedoms' of a
university-to determine for itself... who may be admitted to study.,
23
III. RANKINGS MISLEAD BUYERS OF LEGAL EDUCATION
A. The Criteria Used in Rankings Have Not Been Validated
Judging by the sales of U.S. News's rankings, many people want to know about the
nation's law schools. The readers want advice, and the rankings provide evaluations
22. The same could be true about grades. However, because the Klein & Hamilton study
said that LSAT and reputation were the factors that explained most of the variance, see Klein &
Hamilton, supra note 7, schools may not have worked as hard at increasing UGPA numbers. In
addition, schools are probably less comfortable emphasizing UGPA than LSAT scores because
of the more obvious problems noted above with admitting students primarily by grades.
23. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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done on the cheap. Like many rankings, those published by U.S. News are based on a
number of factors, most of which make use of readily available data. Many of these
criteria are of no inherent interest to the readers of the rankings. A prospective law
student wanting to work as a lawyer has no particular interest in the amount of money a
school spends, the number of volumes in the library, the grades of the other students in
the class, or even the reputation of the school among academics because such
reputations are built primarily on faculty publications and not teaching quality.24
Criteria for rankings are surrogates for experienced quality. The substitutions are
poorly declared.
These criteria that are not directly useful are pressed together into a ranking on the
unstated theory that they are proxies for what applicants should care about. Readers,
and perhaps even the editors at US. News, assume that there is an integrity of the law
school whole that allows the reader to conclude that if the school is good on those
measurables, it will also be good on the immeasurables about which the reader truly
wants to know. But this assumption is unjustified. First, the data from which the
rankings extrapolate are not necessarily correlated to the criteria readers would like to
know about, such as whether the school can provide a quality education, or more
generally, whether a student's professional or personal life will turn out better for
having gone to one school over another. No one has done the careful study needed to
validate the criteria by determining whether the available numbers are indeed
indicators of the many dimensions of true quality.
Second, even if the criteria used by US. News were once good indicators, there is
little reason to believe that they continue to be good indicators now that they have been
announced to the contestants in this ranking game. In other words, the data going into
the US. News rankings are subject to manipulation. Setting aside outright fraud, by
employing the strategies discussed above schools can improve themselves on the
criteria while doing nothing to improve the whole program, indeed while diminishing
the value of the law school experience to their students. For these reasons, the rankings
are disconnected from what many readers want to know.
Even if the criteria used by the rankings were shown to be good indicators of what
readers want to know, or should want to know, the method used by US. News to
combine the factors into a unidimensional ranking has not been shown to be a valid
method for doing so. In other words, the ranks, like the underlying criteria, have not
been validated as useful measures of what is important to those choosing a law school.
B. Rankings Devalue Important Criteria
In addition to the serious problem that the rankings have not been validated, the
rankings may make matters worse for readers by interfering with the processing of
information by the readers who have the ability to balance multiple factors. Numerical
indices carry a false air of precision which may lead some readers to give them too
24. That is not to say that these criteria are not of direct interest to someone, just not the
bulk of those reading the rankings. A prospective student hoping to teach should care about the
reputation of a school among teachers, who will be hiring him or her. A law school graduate
hoping to teach and publish might well care about the grades of the students he or she might be
teaching.
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much weight.25 Rankings can cause a prospective student to think a school is better or
worse for her than it actually is.
Even when the applicant is not directly rerouted by the rankings, he may be
indirectly misguided. By placing all schools on the same scale, rankings give readers
the impression that law schools are all trying to win the same competition, that they all
have the same goals, that they all serve the same interests and needs. The truth is
otherwise. The functions of law schools are many, from providing research and
scholarship about the law to preparing students for legal practice. Even within the
mission of preparing students, the range is wide, from research and teaching in the
academy, to governmental and nongovernmental policy making, to advancing the goals
of corporate clients in the national and international markets, to serving the needs of
average Americans in matters from the mundane to those of life and death.
Unidimensional rankings obscure the multiplicity of roles law schools play in the
training of lawyers. The mere inclusion of numerous factors in the rankings does not
acknowledge the complexity of purposes in legal education.
Rankings can also indirectly influence students by drawing them away from criteria
they think important. Factors left out of the rankings seem less important because of it.
Some criteria, like quality of teaching, are hard to define and quantify, and so do not
get included directly in the current rankings. Other criteria, like the personal feeling of
whether a school would be a comfortable fit, are especially subjective, and cannot be
included in published rankings. Still other criteria, like the distance from the school to
loved ones and scholarships offered, are quantifiable, but are idiosyncratic to the
student, and again cannot be included in rankings published in the mass media. An
open letter from many law school deans to prospective students cites many factors that
students identify as important, many of which are not considered in the US. News
rankings. 26 The point here is that these omissions not only undermine the value of the
rankings but also may have the effect of unjustifiably devaluing criteria that are
important to the reader. By their reassuring appearance ofobjectivity, the rankings lead
readers away from criteria they care about to criteria less central to their goals. An
applicant might choose Pepperdine University School of Lawover Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis based on Pepperdine's move into the top 100 and IU-
Indianapolis's small drop within the second 50, when in fact she would have a much
worse experience at consciously religious Pepperdine because she is an atheist. Thus, a
person who could weigh the factors on her own might be led to place undue weight on
the rankings or their underlying criteria, with the result that she makes a poor decision.
25. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS (1995); Patricia McDonough, Anthony
Lising Antonio, MaryBeth Walpole & Leonor Perez, College Rankings: Democratized College
Knowledge for Whom?, 39 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 513, 531 (1995) (stating that rankings shift
attention of prospective students from what suits the student to the prestige of schools); Nancy
B. Rapoport, Ratings Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & World Report Shouldn't Want to be
Compared to Time and Newsweek-or The New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1099 (1999);
but see Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report Law School Rankings Are Both
Useful and Important, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 487, 489 (2001) (doubting whether anyone
encourages students to take the rankings as gospel).
26. LAW SCHOOL DEANS SPEAK OUT ABOUT RANKINGS (Law School Admission Council
2005), available at http://www.lsac.org/pdfs/2005-2006/RANKING2005-newer.pdf [hereinafter
DEANS SPEAK OUT].
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C. Presentations of Data as Ranks Are Inherently Misleading
All rankings present data in a misleading way. They appear accurate and validated,
but they actually throw away information. Take, for example, the magnitude of
differences. Rankings, unlike measurements or even the summary scores built from
measurements, make schools appear less different or more different in overall quality
than they actually are. The true differences between closely ranked schools are
sometimes small, sometimes large, but are always portrayed as having the same
magnitude.
Assume for an imaginary moment that the U.S. News criteria are the best indicators
of legal education quality and that the U.S. News weighting is optimal for the applicant;
in other words, assume that the final scores given by U.S. News are suitable, at least
with regard to the criteria included. Judging by the output of the 2005 U.S. News
formula, any two schools ranked between 39th and 102nd are less different in quality
than the schools ranked 1 st and 6th. A difference of sixty places near the middle of the
rankings represents about the same difference as six places near the top of the rankings.
If a person could sensibly see Chicago (#6) as superior to Yale (#1), then a person
could also sensibly see Kansas (#100) as superior to Ohio State (#39). According to
US. News, the difference in quality between Stanford (#3) and Michigan (#8) is
greater than the difference between school number 49 and school number 95. The
difference between school number 77 and school number 99 is the same as the
difference between school number 5 and school number 6. The difference in quality
between school number 58 and school number 83 is less than the difference between
school 1 and school 2. Thus, according to U.S. News, an applicant would make a
smaller educational "sacrifice" by choosing Seton Hall (#83) over Loyola (CA) (#58)
than choosing by Harvard (#2) over Yale (#1). Of course some students read the
rankings correctly, recognizing the microscopic size of middle-range differences in
overall quality, and recognizing that mere noise in measured factors can cause large
changes in rank. But others appear to attach more importance to the differences in
ranks than those differences deserve, judging by the conversations that take place on
the Web when new rankings come out.
In the lower half of the ranks, U.S. News ignores minute differences by grouping
schools into two tiers. This also creates problems. While the difference between the top
school in Tier Three and the bottom school in Tier Four might be meaningful, there are
other pairs of schools more closely straddling the border between tier three and tier
four. For those schools, the division into tiers grossly exaggerates the insignificant
differences in overall quality between them.
Figure 1 shows the difference between presenting the scores and presenting the
ranks of U.S. News's top 102 schools. The curved line shows that after an initial drop,
projected quality diminishes very gradually, at least for the schools included. The
lower line graphically represents the fact that ranks continue to drop by the same
amount whether the quality differences are large or small. The line is stepped at the
bottom because U.S. News does not present the ranks of the bottom 77 schools but
merely breaks them into groups. This lower line shows the problem with presenting
schools in clusters. Such groupings will probably exaggerate the difference between
schools across borders of the clusters whose scores are not that different. Finally, note
the divergence of the two lines. The difference between the two is a graphic
representation of one form of distortion inherent in the U.S. News rankings.
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Figure 1. Graphical Presentation of the Difference Between Ranks and Scores, using US. News Ranks
and U.S. News Scores for US. News's top 102 schools and US. News ranks for all 179 schools. Squares
inverse of US. News ranks; circles = US. News scores (linearly transformed). The actual U.S. News ranks
are subtracted from 180. In order to put them on a similar scale, the actual U.S. News scores are
transformed linearly by adding 97 (making the tangent at school 20). While the shapes of the curves are
not arbitrary (one is linear with steps and the other is curved), how they intersect is arbitrary and depends
on the choices for the constant used in the transformation of scores. Regardless of which constant is
chosen, however, the basic point remains: presenting the differences as ranks distorts those differences in
some way. Data Source: America's Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 11, 2005, at 72-73.
One way of reducing the likelihood that students will exaggerate the differences
between schools is to present the differences graphically. One example would be a
scatter plot of scores plotted against full-time resident tuition for U.S. News's top 102
schools, as shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of the US. News score for the top 102 schools plotted against the cost for a full-time
resident to attend. Data Sources: America's Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 11, 2005, at 72-73.
Another way to present these differences is to graph the scores rather than list them by
rank, as in figure 3.
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Schools in Order of 2005 U.S. News Ranks
Figure 3. Bar graph showing the top 102 schools by score. Data Source: America's Best Graduate
Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 2005, at 72-73.
Although presentation of differences via rankings is misleading enough, combining
rankings to create other rankings is even more dangerous. Suppose that two criteria, A
and B, are to be combined into one summary score. On criterion A, three schools score
10, 2, and 0. On criterion B, they score 4, 5, and 6. Their ranks are 1st, 2nd, and 3rd,
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respectively on criterion A, and 3rd, 2nd, and 1 st on criterion B. Combining these ranks
will give the three schools the same final score, all tying for first place. Turning
cardinal numbers into ordinal ranks has thrown away information. If each point of
achievement on the two criteria is equally important to the evaluator, the underlying
scores should be added, yielding 14, 7, and 6, which shows that one school is
substantially better than the other two, which are close but not the same. If the two
criteria, rather than the points achievable on the two criteria, are of equal importance to
the evaluator, then the scores should be standardized, yielding combined z-scores of
0.16, -0.46, and 0.30, showing the third school to be the best, by a small margin over
the first and a large margin over the second.27 In either case, using the underlying
scores instead of the ranks preserves the information as to relative differences. Using
rankings in numerical processes is a bad idea; garbage in, garbage out.
D. The Very Act of Publishing Rankings Distorts U.S. News's Reputation Measures
1. U.S. News Itself Has Changed How Law Professors View Law Schools
a. Two Hypotheses
The annual rankings of law schools by U.S. News do not go unnoticed by members
of law faculties. In addition, law professors have very little information about the
quality of programs at many competing schools. Given this concern about the rankings
and the lack of information from other sources, it would not be a shock to find that U.S.
News has influenced how law schools were ranked by the law professors that it
surveyed. One would expect U.S. News to have pulled the reputation of a school
among law teachers toward that school's previous ranking by US. News. For example,
if the faculty reputation score of School Xin a given year was 10th best and U.S. News
ranked School X at 20th that same year, the faculty reputation score would probably
move down toward 20th in the following year.
If this is true, the early U.S. News rankings may have become self-fulfilling
prophecies of the value of schools' degrees. The schools ranked highly by U.S. News
moved up in faculty reputation score and tended to stay there, and the schools that got
low initial rankings moved down. In other words, the rankings were reflexive; there
was an echo effect. 28 In the spring, U.S. News pronounced Yale to be number one. In
the fall U.S. News listened carefully for new opinions. But what it really heard coming
back was the echo of its own previous publication.
This echo effect would be expected to diminish overtime. Suppose the reputation of
School X, in the hypothetical example above, moves to 15th in year two. Because that
reputation is a part of the US. News rank in year two, but is dragging Xdown less than
in year one, X's overall US. News rank should move up, say to 9th, in year two. In year
three, the same thing occurs, withX's reputation moving to perhaps 11 th and its overall
US. News rank moving to 8th. In year four, the reputation moves to 8th, the same as
27. The z-scores were calculated as follows: ((score - mean score)/standard deviation). The
rounded z-scores are 1.39, -0.46, and -0.93 for criterion A, and -1.22, 0, and 1.22 for criterion
B. The numbers reflected above are the sums of the two z-scores.
28. I have borrowed half of this expression from Brian Leiter, who called this the "echo
chamber." See Brian Leiter, Commentary, How to RankLaw Schools, 81 Ind. L.J. 47, 51 (2006).
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the overall rank. Eventually, the system reaches equilibrium and when it does the US.
News ranks will have no more ability to pull the reputations. Of course, if the other
factors change, the system never stabilizes completely, but the amount of room for the
US. News ranks to pull the reputations will not be large. Thus, over time, the echo
effect should diminish.
From these thoughts, two hypotheses emerge:
1. The US. News rankings changed law school reputations among the
law professors they surveyed.
2. The yearly influence of US. News on reputations diminished over
time.
b. Numerical Evidence
Richard Schmalbeck found in an earlier examination of specific law schools that
overall rankings had little or no effect on reputations. 29 So, a more comprehensive
examination is in order.
To test the two hypotheses, academic reputation ranks in year T + 1 were regressed
on academic reputation ranks in year T and US. News overall scores in year T. The
regression was:
academicrankT+l = 83 o + ,8 . academicrankT +,82. usnewsT
where fil and /2 are statistical weights for the two predictors and fl0 is a constant. Each
year's data, except for the first (1990) and last (2004), was used twice, once as year T
and then again as year T + 1. Of course the previous year's academic rank was a very
strong predictor of the new academic rank; one would not expect much variation in
academic reputation from year to year. But the US. News score was also a predictor of
the new academic ranks and was significant at the .05 level (regression 2). A second
regression added twenty-six interaction terms, thirteen dummies for years times each of
the two variables. In this regression, the US. News rank in year T increased in
significance to the .001 level (regression 3).
For another regression, academic reputation scores were converted into ranks.
These academic reputation ranks were compared to US. News ranks. A difference
between the academic reputation rank and the US. News rank should lead to a change
in the same direction in the academic reputation rank in the following year. New
variables were constructed from the differences. One new variable was academic rank
in year T minus US. News rank in year T. Another new constructed variable was
academic rank in year T minus academic rank in year T + 1. If the first hypothesis is
correct, the latter new variable should be a function of the former new variable. So, the
regression equation was:
academicrankT - academicrankT+ = ,8o + Ili(academicrankT - usnewsrankT).
29. Richard Schmalbeck, The Durability ofLaw School Reputation, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568,
576-80, 585 n.21, 586 (1998).
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Aside from the conversion of scores to ranks,3 ° this regression equation is
mathematically similar to the previous one, but is more restricted in that the
coefficients for academicrankT and usnewsrankr are linked together. The result was
that the difference between US. News rank and academic rank was a predictor of the
subsequent change in the academic rank, significant at the .001 level (regression 4).31
This effect was stronger for the schools that were in U.S. News's top 17 in 1990. For
the top 17, the coefficient is .200, and for the schools not in the top 17 the coefficient is
.045 (regressions 11-12). This difference is significant (p < 0.05) (regression 14). It
appears that professors of law are following US. News, and following more closely for
the schools initially ranked in the top 17.
The second hypothesis was that this correlation would diminish with time. To test
this, the years were divided into halves, T before 1997 and after 1996, and separate
regressions were performed on the two subsets. For the earlier years, the difference
between US. News and the academic rank was a significant (at the .001 level)
predictor of the coming change in academic rank and had a coefficient of. 102. For the
later years, the difference was not a significant predictor and had a coefficient of .028
(regression 4). A dummy variable for the early years was interacted with the
independent variable. When the resulting interaction term was added to the regression
for all years, its coefficient was significant at the .01 level (regression 13), showing that
the effect was significantly stronger for the early years.
In the past, prospective students might have been well-advised to pay attention to
the academic reputations reported by US. News even though the reputation surveys
could have been done better. Now, however, because US. News rankings have
influenced the reputations the surveys were designed to measure, the reputation scores
have lost value as independent indicators of quality.
c. Anecdotal Support
There is anecdotal evidence that those entering law teaching are reading and
heeding US. News. One faculty member from a school that rose in the rankings has
stated that moving up in US. News had the effect of improving the pool of hires from
which to choose new faculty. Interestingly, the rise in US. News improved the school's
pool of applicants for faculty positions more quickly than it improved the pool of
applicants for student positions. Perhaps, since it is their own status as professional
educators that is at stake, it is not surprising that legal education insiders follow US.
News more closely than potential applicants. But whatever the reasons, the evidence
confirms that law professors parrot back to US. News what it publishes, and US. News
reports that parrotage as if it were an independent source.
2. US. News Is Changing Law School Reputations Among Lawyers
US. News has had a similar effect on the reputation of schools as seen by lawyers.
To test for this, the third regression was repeated using lawyer reputations instead of
30. It was necessary to use ranks instead of scores because the reputation scores were not
published by US. News until 1998.
31. I ran the regressions with a panel data approach and got essentially the same results.
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academic reputations. The difference between U.S. News rank and lawyer rank was a
significant (.001 level) predictor of the subsequent change in lawyer ranks of the
schools (regression 5).
However, there are some differences from the results in the academic reputation
regressions. US. News seems to have had a smaller effect on lawyer reputation scores
in early years but a larger effect more recently (regression 5). This difference is
significant at the .001 level (regression 15). One way to explain this is to assume that
during the first few years lawyers did not care much about the US. News rankings. As
the students that had chosen schools based in part on US. News became lawyers,
however, they changed the mix of lawyers surveyed into a group that was paying
attention. In addition, it simply may have taken lawyers more time to pay attention to
US. News.
3. US. News Has Changed Law School Reputations Among Matriculants
US. News has had a similar effect on the reputation of schools among law school
matriculants. If the LSAT scores of entering students are an indicator of the reputation
of schools among prospective students, the LSAT and UGPA numbers can be
examined with the same lens applied above to the academic and lawyer indicators of
reputation. The disparity between the LSAT rank and U.S. News rank in year T should
predict some of the change in LSAT rank from year T to year T + 1 . And it does. As a
predictor, the disparity was significant at the .001 level for the 75th and 50th percentile
LSAT and at the .005 level for the 25th percentile LSAT (regressions 6-8). The results
for the change in UGPA were similar. The difference between UGPA rank and US.
News rank was a significant predictor of the subsequent change in UGPA rank,
significant at the .001 level for the 75th and 25th UGPA percentiles (regressions 9-10).
Therefore, US. News may be affecting the behavior of applicants to law schools in the
same way that it has affected the reputations among lawyers and academics.
32
The assumption just made was that the LSAT and UGPA numbers are indicators of
the reputations of law schools among prospective students. But are they? At any law
school, these numbers are a function of both the attractiveness of the schools to the
applicants and the attractiveness of the applicants to the schools. Changes in the
median or any other percentile LSAT or UGPA of a school could be due to changes in
32. While the general effect is clear, the response of students is complicated in a number of
ways. For example, after the median LSAT at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
rose from 162 to 163, the admissions office saw a substantial reduction in the number of
applications from students with LSAT scores of 162, presumably because students rightly
deduced that their odds of admission were substantially lower than they would have been the
previous year. Professors Sauder and Lancaster have found that U.S. News rankings have
significant effects on the decisions of applicants. Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do
Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions
Process of Law Schools, 40 LAw & Soc'Y REv. (forthcoming Mar. 2006). One study of
applications to undergraduate schools also found that changes in rank affect number of
applications. James Monks & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Impact of U.S. News & World Report
College Rankings on Admissions Outcomes and Pricing Policies at Selective Private
Institutions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7227, 1999).
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the admissions process at the school or changes in the attitudes of students toward the
school.
It seems unlikely that recent changes in the LSAT numbers at most schools are due
to changes in the behavior of admissions committees. Since the late 1990s at the latest,
law school admissions offices have been aware that the LSAT statistics are an
important component of the U.S. News rankings. Many, if not most, law schools, in
their attempts to increase their ranks, have increased the weight given LSAT scores to
the point that they deny very few applications that would increase their LSAT numbers.
When all law schools admit all of the students that will help their U.S. News numbers,
law school admissions behavior drops out as a confounding factor, leaving the choices
of students as the key determinant of the LSAT statistics for each school. Thus, the
assumption that changes in LSAT and UGPA percentiles reflect changes in the
reputations of schools among applicants is justifiable. The ability of a school to
increase its LSAT numbers relative to other schools' depends on the choices of
applicants. Their behavior in turn depends on whether the school is attractive to
applicants, which depends in part on the reputations of the schools among applicants.
The assumption that UGPA numbers of a school are mostly up to the students is not
as safe. Schools have not yet caved in on that criterion and still reject some applicants
who would help their UGPA statistics. As a result, changes in law school behavior
could account for some of the changes in relative ranks. Nonetheless, if many schools
have stable admissions policies, it should still be true that schools will increase their
UGPA numbers as students find the schools to be more attractive.
Therefore, the findings that changes in the LSAT and UGPA statistics can be
expressed as a function of differences between LSAT and UGPA ranks and US. News
rank supports the conclusion that US. News has influenced the reputations of schools
among prospective students. It is not a surprise that US. News influences the attitudes
of applicants; presumably, that is why applicants buy the rankings issue in numbers
large enough to keep US. News publishing it year after year in the face of heaps of
criticism for doing so. Nevertheless, US. News rankings seem to have been self-
fulfilling prophecies: the rankings led students with higher LSATs and UGPAs to more
highly ranked schools, and the matriculations of those students cemented the higher
rankings, whether or not the rankings were deserved (whatever that means) in the first
instance. If a school had an aberrantly good year, US. News helped to cast that result
in concrete, reducing the chances the school would return to its previous rank.
4. Unreliable Reputations Make Up a Large Part of the U.S. News Rankings
The bottom line is that a number of the current U.S. News factors are polluted by the
US. News rankings and thus should not be considered to be based on independent
sources of information. Reputations among faculty members, reputations among
lawyers, LSATs, and UGPAs are all influenced by US. News. Those factors make up
62.5% of the US. News score. Eventually, if the remaining 37.5% factors are stable,
the effect of that 62.5% will diminish nearly to zero. If the other 37.5% are not stable,
the effect of the reputation factors will be to slow the movement of the rankings,
although those reputation factors will continue to trend toward the ranks that would
result from the 37.5% factors alone. The reputation factors will be essentially wiped
out of the rankings, except as an occasional stabilizer, and the rankings will settle in to
what they would be if constructed entirely from the factors that make up the other
37.5%. Thus those remaining factors must bear all of the weight of the US. News
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rankings, making it all the more important that the remaining factors be legitimate
indicators of quality. As the next subpart explains, that is a responsibility they cannot
bear.
E. A Number of the Remaining Criteria Are Also Problematic
If the goal is to compare the quality of legal education programs offered at the
nation's law schools, a number of the criteria included in the rankings are problematic
because they do not directly measure anything prospective students care about. It is, of
course, possible that these criteria are good indicators even though they are not direct
measures of quality of instruction or experience. Careful research might show that they
do provide useful insight into the differences between schools. But that sort ofresearch
has not been done. It is also possible that there is such a strong logical connection
between the factors and what students would want to know that the factors can serve as
indicators until it is proved that they do not correlate with quality. The purpose of
much of the following discussion is to show that the logical connection between the
factors and quality is not so strong that they can stand as indicators without empirical
validation.
1. Bar Passage Rate
One of the factors used by U.S. News is bar passage. The number used by US. News
for comparing schools is a ratio of the school's bar pass rate in the jurisdiction where
the plurality of a school's students take the bar to the overall pass rate in that
jurisdiction. This ratio is a poor indicator of school quality because it is statistically
easier for a school to exceed the target bar pass rate by a large percentage in states
where the overall rate is low-such as in California where the overall pass rate for first
time takers is 61 0/--and harder to have a strong positive result where the overall pass
rate is high, such as in Minnesota where it is 92%.
To see why this is so, consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose that
there are two states, Xand Y, that have applicants with the same ability taking the same
bar exam. State Xsets the cut score at 125 and has a 60% pass rate and State Ysets the
cut score at 110 and has a 90% pass rate. Two schools in those states matriculate
students with the same aptitude for the bar exam. Without any instruction, 30% of the
test takers in either state would score above 110 and 10% would score above 125. But
the two schools provide different quality instruction. School A, in State X, teaches 85%
of its students to score above 110, and 70% to score above 125. School B, in State Y,
teaches 100% of its students to score above 110, and 95% to score above 125. US.
News would give School A a score of 70/60 or 1.17, and School B a score of 95/90 or
1.06. Hypothetical School B has done far more to increase the chances a student will
score well on the bar exam, yet it receives a lower score on the U.S. News bar passage
criterion. The ratio used by U.S. News is not a valid indicator of quality when the
average rates vary as much as they do across states.
33
33. At the 2004 Midwest Law and Economics Conference, a participant suggested that an
"odds ratio" might be a better way to represent this factor. While it does account for the
differences in state bar pass rates, the odds ratio runs into difficulties when the bar pass rate
nears 100%, as it does at some schools, because the denominator approaches zero and the ratios
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Other problems are equally troubling. The bar pass rate is a poor indicator of school
quality because students vary greatly in their ability to pass the bar before they
matriculate. One cannot tell from the passage rate whether the school has improved or
reduced its students' chances of passing. Suppose School C doubles the chances its
students will pass from 45% to 90% and School D increases its students' chances of
passing the bar somewhat from 80% to 92%. A valid measure of bar-related teaching
quality would rate C higher than D, but US. News does just the opposite. The pass rate
of 92% from a school with top students might reflect poorer teaching than a 90% pass
rate in the same state from a school with less-gifted students. The U.S. News method
fails to account for differences in student aptitude and effort.
Another problem with the approach employed by US. News is that the students
taking the bar in the home states are often not a representative sample of the whole
graduating class. Comparing Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington and the
University of Illinois, a greater portion of IU-B's best students do not take the local
bar exam. As a result, IU-B will be at a disadvantage compared to Illinois even if the
schools do an equal job of preparing students for the bar exam.
The discussion above has assumed that bar passage is a relevant consideration.
There are reasons, however, to refrain from considering it at all. For starters, the bar
passage rate is not a great measure of school quality. As noted above, preparing
students to be good lawyers, for cases from the most routine to the most difficult, is not
at all the same as preparing them to pass a single test of legal knowledge.
More important, bar passage might correlate negatively with preparing students for
life in the law. The time faculty members have to spend with students is limited, as is
the time students have to study. Teaching students what they need to know to pass the
bar will reduce the time teachers and students can spend on other lessons. Most
teachers expend considerable effort figuring out what their students need to know to be
successful and to be good citizens of the legal world. Spending more time on bar
passage imposes costs in terms of other educational goals. No one has made a
convincing case that law school faculty members have undervalued bar passage in their
teaching.
2. Starting Salaries
Another factor that is sometimes thought of as a measure of law school quality is the
average starting salary of its graduates. One major problem with this as an indicator is
that it, like bar passage, does not account for differences in the income potential of the
students before they started school. To account for differences in matriculants, one
might construct a value-added model by regressing salaries on LSAT and UGPA, and
perhaps other pre-law school indicia of income potential. One advantage of
incorporating the results of such a model into popular rankings is that it would reduce
the incentive to overweight or lie in order to increase the LSAT, because doing so
would reduce the value added. Such a regression ought also to include the geographic
region of the employers because there are large regional differences in starting
climb dramatically for small changes in number of students that pass. For example, in a
jurisdiction with a 90% pass rate, a school with a 99% pass rate gets twice the score of a school
with a 98% pass rate, which seems far too great a difference for the one extra student that
passes.
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salaries. 34 Without such a factor, schools that produce lawyers for markets that have
lower wages and costs of living would look worse than they actually are. One problem
with doing such a regression is that it would require data not now available. Another
problem is that the numbers do not include gumption and other factors that may be
known to the admissions committees. For that reason, assessing the value added by
schools might best be done by comparing the success of students that were accepted by
a school but attended a lower ranked school to the success of students that were
accepted and did attend, as has been done for undergraduate programs. 35 Even
constructed to account for those confounding variables, a simple starting-salary factor
is problematic because an average or median does not give any indication of the spread
of salaries, and a risk-averse student might care as much about that as about the starting
level. He might prefer a low starting salary in order to avoid a small risk of an even
lower starting salary. Finally, there is reason to believe that some of the jobs with the
highest salaries are not the jobs in which lawyers are happiest.36 If the students that
receive the best preparation might vie for jobs that pay less, higher salaries are not a
mark of better preparation.
3. Employment at Graduation and at Nine Months Out
It would seem that whether students getjobs at all after law school would be a good
measure of the quality of their education. After all, employers want employees who
will be good lawyers, not just those who can pass two days' worth of exams.
Employment is a proxy for employability which may be a proxy for quality of legal
training. Even without considering the complex of issues surrounding the questions of
what kind of work will increase a student's happiness as a worker and whether
improving the employability of graduates makes them better contributors to society,
there are at least two reasons to worry when employment is used as an indicator of
school quality. The first is that this factor can be manipulated. Law schools can lie
about their employment. More likely, law schools can hire their graduates into
temporary positions so that they will be employed at the point in time when the
measurement is taken. Clearly, if the rate a month later is only 80%, a 100%
employment rate is more misleading than revealing.
The second problem with employment rates is that they may get too much weight in
light of the small differences that exist. Because U.S. News currently standardizes the
scores on each of its criteria and then adds the standardized scores, it does not matter
whether the actual differences are small or large; they will get 12% of the weight. If the
34. In their very interesting Article in this symposium, Professors Henderson and Morriss
suggest that the regional employment market, particularly for high-paying law jobs, affects a
student's choice of law school. See William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student
Quality as Measured by LSA TScores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81
IND. L.J. 163, 188-190 (2006).
35. See Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More
Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, Q. J. EcoN.,
Nov. 2002, at 1491.
36. Professor Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt and I will discuss this point further in a piece
forthcoming in this volume of the Indiana Law Journal detailing the results of a survey we
conducted of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington alumni.
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reputation factors are reflexive and therefore unimportant in the long run, employment
at nine months becomes one-third of the critical set of factors. The smaller the actual
differences in employment rates, the less likely those differences deserve to make up,
effectively, one-third of the rankings. There is some evidence that the spread is
decreasing, but more data are needed to confirm or rebut a trend.37
Even if there has not been substantial convergence already, it seems likely that there
will be substantial convergence in the future because schools are expending
considerable effort to increase their employment figures. While this is good for
students, it reduces the value of the employment statistic as a measure of school quality
to the point where the statistic cannot support the weight it is given.
The third problem with US. News's use of employment percentages is that the
employment rates reported are not limited to employment in law-relatedjobs. The US.
News questionnaire references the American Bar Association (ABA) questionnaire,
which in turn references the National Association of Law Placement (NALP)
questionnaire. NALP has taken the position that for purposes of its questionnaire, "a
job is a job." There is no distinction between clerking for a federal judge and flipping
burgers. Data that is so weakly related to the purpose of going to law school cannot
carry the weight US. News loads upon it.
4. Scholarship Money
Another ill-considered factor is the extra credit U.S. News gives for scholarship
money. First, it paints an inaccurate picture when the discount given to residents by
state schools is not considered to be financial support. It is hard to see how tuition
discounts for in-state students are different from scholarships given for other reasons.
More important, scholarships are of little to no value to the students who do not get
them. Assume that the other US. News criteria are accurate and properly weighted and
School A ranks higher than School B. And assume that when scholarship money is
added to the mix, School B rises above School A. Should a student that gets no money
from either school choose School B? Of course not. The inclusion of scholarship
money has misled her. For those who do get the scholarship money, it should go into
the price consideration, not into the quality-of-product part of the analysis. As long as
tuition is not a factor, and it should not be, reductions in tuition should not be a factor
either.
The inclusion of what is effectively a price factor into the rankings serves as a good
example of the problem with forcing a variety of factors onto a unidimensional scale.
For wealthy students, a $100,000 difference in price is of little moment; for others it is
critical. This is easy to see when it comes to price. But it is also true for the other
factors that go into the rankings. For some students, employment rates matter, for
others they do not. For some students, reputations matter, for others they do not. US.
News's weighting of the factors assumes all buyers want the same thing, when it is
obvious they do not. An opportunity to place their own weights on the factors would
serve them far better than a single arbitrary weighting.
37. The standard deviation of 0.096 in 2000 had shrunk to 0.063 in 2002. However, it had
grown to 0.079 in 2004. (The figures for 1994 and 1996 were for employment at six months out
of school, rather than nine, and are not comparable.)
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5. Faculty/Student Ratio
All else being equal, the more teachers there are per student, the better the
educational experience probably is for the students. But all else is not equal. Schools
impose different course loads on their teachers. Suppose School X has 400 students
taught by forty teachers for a faculty-to-student ratio of 1:10, while School Yhas 400
students taught by fifty teachers for a faculty-to-student ratio of 1:8. School Ygets the
higher ranking. Assume, however, that the teaching load at School X is four courses
and the teaching load at School Y is three courses per year. If all students take eight
courses, that is 3200 student-courses to be taught at each school. If the students are
evenly distributed, at School X there will be twenty students in each course and at
School Ythere will be more than twenty-one students in each course. One might argue
that this is not an important difference, but that is beside the point. School Y has been
given credit in the rankings when it deserves discredit. If the differences in course
loads were random, it might be acceptable to ignore this complication. But the teaching
loads are inversely correlated with faculty-to-student ratios. Schools that have higher
faculty-to-student ratios tend to be the richer schools, and those schools tend to require
less teaching of their faculty. This inverse relationship undermines the validity of the
faculty-to-student ratio as an indicator of the quality of schooling a student can expect.
One other problem with using ratios of students and teachers is that it is not clear
which is more informative, a student/faculty ratio or a faculty/student ratio. For
mathematical reasons, it matters to the ultimate rankings which ratio is used, but US.
News has offered no reason for its apparently arbitrary choice.38
6. Acceptance Ratio
US. News uses the acceptance ratio as one indicator of selectivity. The theory is, of
course, that a school that accepts a small portion of the students that apply must be
highly selective and that is a good marker of quality. But there are a number of
problems with using acceptance ratio as a proxy for quality. For one thing, it is quite
likely that some schools attract many applications simply by virtue of being in a major
population center. Another serious problem is that the number of applications to a
school depends on the clarity of signals it sends with regard to admission standards. A
top quality school might be attractive to many students, but if it lets it be known that it
accepts applicants only if they have an LSAT above 165, it will get few applications
and have to accept many of them to fill the class. It is illogical to conclude that schools
that are not highly selective are not high quality. On the other hand it is also not true
that schools that are highly selective are high in quality. An average school might be
able to attract many applications by announcing that it will randomly select ten students
for its class each year. More realistically, a school can keep applications up by making
the admissions standards vague. The more students there are that might have a chance
of acceptance, the more students that might apply. While it is true that some schools
have difficulty attracting enough students to fill the class and will have a low
38. To see the difference in operation, play The Ranking Game. See supra note 3.
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acceptance ratio for that reason, for the majority of schools, the acceptance ratio is
more an indicator of the predictability of admission than the quality of the school.
7. Wealth of School-For Example, Faculty Resources
Generally, the more money a school has, the better the experience for its students.
For that reason, faculty resources is a valid indicator of educational quality. However,
some organizations are more efficient than others and that difference in efficiency
weakens the connection between a school's resources and expenditures and the quality
of its product.
There are two other problems as well. Some faculties put more effort into teaching
and others put more into research. Although research benefits the students by training
and informing the faculty, by legitimating an aura of inquiry, and by increasing the
reputation of the school, it is quite possible that many faculty members spend less time
on teaching than would serve the students well. And the schools that tend to spend
more on faculty resources for research than what is optimal for students tend to be the
schools that have more money. This further weakens the connection between school
resources and the quality of the product the student will purchase. Finally, as with
starting pay for graduates, there are substantial regional differences in cost-of-living
and lifestyle attractions that allow schools in some regions to attract an accomplished
faculty using less money than would be necessary in other regions.
Despite those substantial caveats, it is likely that there is still a positive correlation
between resources and merit, so it makes some sense to include resources as a factor in
rankings. Indeed, if this is an important factor, it may provide good justification for
publishing rankings and not data on the various criteria. Schools would often be
unwilling to provide accurate data on resources if that information might be made
public. They may, however, be willing to provide the data if it is hidden inside a
ranking based on other factors. In this way rankings may serve the purpose of getting
into the public domain the useful information on resources that cannot be published
outright. Rankings provide a way of publishing secret information without revealing
too much of the secret.
To reiterate a point made above, most of the criteria on which the U.S. News
rankings are based are not direct measures of anything particularly valuable to a
prospective student or an employer wanting to hire a student. US. News criteria might
be indicators of quality, but they have not been validated by empirical study, and they
have not been established to be logically connected with what readers of the rankings
might reasonably hope to learn.
IV. IMPROVING THE VALIDITY OF EVALUATION
If anyone were willing to expend substantial resources to learn more about how law
schools compare, he or she might consult experts in educational evaluation. The
process of talking to such experts would itself help those interested in law school
evaluation to think about criteria for evaluation that they would otherwise not even
imagine. Some of those experts would probably recommend close human observation
of the schools to learn about the schools directly or to validate numerical indicators of
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quality. Medical schools employed educational evaluators to help them assess their
teaching in the 1970s.39 But it does not appear that any person or group is interested
enough to spend the money required for serious study of law schools.
The question then becomes whether evaluation on the cheap can be improved.
Many of those buying the law school rankings issues of U.S. News are prospective
students, and there are some changes that would make the rankings more useful to
those readers. Two improvements suggested above would be to publish the data
without constructing summary scores, or if summary scores are calculated, to add a
graph that shows the magnitude of differences in those scores. Another improvement
would be to find factors that are better indicators of school quality. A list of a few
possible factors follows.
A. Student Involvement
One criterion that might improve rankings by indicating the level of learning is the
degree of student involvement in learning activities. George Kuh at Indiana University
is studying this, but the data are not public, so they cannot be used, at this time, in
rankings. 40 Nevertheless, this sort of research might be available in the future to
students trying to choose a school.
B. Quality of Teaching
The most obvious deficiency in most of the current rankings is that they lack
information on the quality of teaching. As this is a central concern for students, it ought
to receive more attention. One of the reasons that it does not is that there are many
different aspects of teaching quality. Some schools will be better at teaching skills of
policy analysis, some better at teaching legal doctrine, and some better at teaching the
arts of legal research and writing.
Surveys of students are sometimes conducted, but it is not clear that students have
enough information about what they need to know to evaluate their learning
experience. Faculty members who read student evaluations know that students often
praise or criticize in ways that show their notions of the goals of legal education differ
from those of the faculty. For example, students would probably think "Professor X
made us learn all of the course ourselves," is a criticism, while many teachers would
consider it a compliment.
C. Providing Educational Opportunities
In addition to clinical programs and interdisciplinary studies from biology to
economics to feminist studies, special learning opportunities outside the classroom
form an important part of the academic life at some law schools. Speakers on campus,
library facilities, internships, and other enriching and enhancing experiences await
39. The use of educational evaluators at medical schools has been personally communicated
to me by Robert E. Stake, an educational evaluator at the University of Illinois.
40. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, LSSSE 2004 ANNUAL SURVEY
RESULTS: STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW SCHOOLS: A FIRST LOOK, (2004), http://www.iub.edu/
-nsse/Issse/ 2004_annualreport/html/index.htm.
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students in varying degrees and in varying formats at different schools. Capturing and
presenting some of that variety should help applicants to find a school well tailored to
their interests and aspirations.
D. Obtaining a Desired Job
Instead of surveying alumni about law school reputations, researchers could more
usefully survey alumni regarding whether they obtained the jobs they wanted to obtain.
Such measures of individual success, if taken at enough schools, would help when
added to the rankings. Differences in quality of life as a lawyer, and the lawyers'
perceptions of their schools' contributions to those differences, would also be useful to
students comparing schools. The University of Michigan has been gathering such data
for many years, and Ken Dau-Schmidt and this author have been surveying Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington graduates in recent years. Such data would be
more helpful, and useful in rankings, if they were gathered by all schools. And, the
gathering of such data could be considered an attribute of good governance. If persons
ranking law schools would include a simple factor for whether the school
systematically surveyed its graduates, that factor might encourage such surveys and
thereby generate information useful to prospective students.
E. Achieving Happiness
Why limit surveys to legal success? It is possible that law school makes a difference
to happiness in other dimensions. At least one study indicates that being married
improves happiness. 41 A prospective student might sensibly consider whether he or she
is likely to find a spouse while in law school. Such data would probably not be too
costly for schools to collect. It might also be useful to know whether attendance at any
schools led to higher rates of divorce or imprisonment. Gathering such data is too
much to expect of U.S. News. It would cost a lot and probably not sell many more
magazines. But it is not too much to expect of academic research. This kind of
information would be useful to the world and parallels existing institutional research.
F. More Rankings Would Help
US. News is in the business of supplying a product for a consumer demand, and its
success indicates that the US. News is providing what people want to read. Rankings
are popular for a number of reasons. For one, they appeal to our interest in contests.
That consumers like contests is shown by the popularity of sports and reality TV
shows. That consumers like serious matters to be treated as contests is evident in the
media coverage of political campaigns, where the strategies and maneuvers of the
candidates get more attention than the issues. Rankings turn the suppliers of legal
education into competitors in an entertaining game where the goal is higher rank. In
addition to being entertaining, rankings are decisive. When people of modest means
face the prospect of spending $100,000 on a product they know nearly nothing about,
41. Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PRoC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 11176,
11178 (2002).
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rankings offer security by resolving doubts. It is much more comforting to be presented
with a clear basis for decision, a unilateral ranking, than to be presented with a mass of
information from which many choices could be justified. Many consumers of
educational rankings do not want arguments, they want answers. a2
Perhaps the best hope for change, then, is that more sources will cater to this
consumer demand for simple answers to complex questions. As is indicated by Michael
Sauder and Wendy Nelson Espeland43 in this issue, the students, the public, and the law
schools would be better served if there were more rankings. And these rankings should
not be limited to those made from a supposedly neutral and general perspective.
Special interests should publish their rankings. Environmentalists should identify top
schools in the production of environmental lawyers or policy. Corporate and political
interests should likewise publish their own partisan rankings. If more legal academics
would follow Brian Leiter's lead 44 and collectively and individually create their own
rankings, and especially if they were to invest additional time and money in generating
valid information on new criteria, the diversity and utility of the rankings would
increase.
It should not be assumed, however, that the mere addition of new rankings will
solve the incentive problems that afflict the legal academy. Despite the fact that there
are a number of popular rankings of business schools, some business educators have
argued that rankings are having detrimental effects on business education. 45 Indeed,
because business schools are more responsive to incentives and their rankings rely far
too much on satisfaction of graduates, business programs may have suffered even more
destructive effects than those felt so far in law schools.
42. Perhaps The Law School Ranking Game Web site, see supra note 3, could increase its
viewership beyond the current thousand hits per day if it were marketed more as a source of
personalized answers and less as a critique of rankings. It is somewhat ironic that those headed
to law school want answers instead of arguments.
43. Sauder & Espeland, supra note 19; see also Leiter, supra note 28, at 52.
44. Leiter's Law School Rankings, http://www.leitterrankings.com (ranking law schools on
faculty and student quality) (last visited Nov. 24, 2005).
45. Consider the following abstract from SSRN:
U.S. business schools are locked in a dysfunctional competition for media
rankings that diverts resources from long-term knowledge creation, which earned
them global pre-eminence, into short-term strategies aimed at improving their
rankings. MBA curricula are distorted by quick fix, look good packaging changes
designed to influence rankings criteria, at the expense of giving students a
rigorous, conceptual framework that will serve them well over their entire careers.
Research, undergraduate education, and Ph.D. programs suffer as faculty time is
diverted to almost continuous MBA curriculum changes, strategic planning
exercises, and public relations efforts. Unless they wake up to the dangers of
dysfunctional rankings competition, U.S. business schools are destined to lose
their dominant global position and become a classic case study of how myopic
decision-making begets institutional mediocrity.
Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, & Jerold L. Zimmerman, What's Really Wrong With U.S.
Business Schools? (unpublished paper, 2005), http://ssm.com/abstract=-766404.
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V. WILL THE MARKET OFFER BETTER RANKINGS IN THE FUTURE?46
Regarding some of the defects in the US. News rankings, there is some hope that
U.S. News will improve its product, and perhaps more hope that another supplier will
displace US. News by providing a better product. Measuring the quality of educational
experience offered by schools is not easy, but it could be done better, and better
rankings should attract readers, perhaps even readers willing to pay for the information.
If Brian Leiter's rankings more accurately depict the relative quality of schooling a
student can expect, the market might gradually shift to his product. If this occurs, US.
News will have less influence. Other law teachers-and various lawyer organizations--
could join in the competition, offering alternative ranking systems, ones that give
students better information on which to base their choices. It is likely that there is
sufficient demand to support additional suppliers.
It must be remembered, however, that there are two types of problems with the
criteria used in current rankings. One problem is that the criteria do not directly assess
something of value to the student: they have not been validated as good indicators of
the quality of educational experience a student can expect, and they are not closely
enough connected by logic to what the student would want to know to justify an
assumption that they are valid measures of quality. There is reason for hope that future
suppliers of rankings will base their rankings on criteria of greater validity than those
used now.
The second problem, discussed in the first section above, is that the criteria used in
the current rankings create harmful incentives for law schools, and to some extent for
undergraduate students hoping to attend law school. An increase in the number of
rankings taken seriously by employers and prospective students would reduce the
influence of US. News on law school behavior, which could free schools to provide
better educational experiences for their students. But little autonomy will be reclaimed
if the alternative rankings employ the same criteria currently being used by US. News.
For example, Brian Leiter has included the 25th percentile LSAT figures in his
omnibus ranking, so his ranking does little to de-emphasize that criterion in the eyes of
law school admissions committees. Is there any reason to believe that new rankings
will exclude criteria when they learn those criteria create undesirable incentives? From
where would such pressure come?
A. Schools as Facilitators of Rankings: Just Say "No "?
Law schools aid and abet US. News by providing data for use in the rankings.
Faculty members, perhaps proud to have been asked, return US. News's surveys,
sometimes answering in ways that will serve their own interests rather than the interests
of the US. News readers. Faculty members are unlikely to refuse answering surveys by
US. News in order to support a competing ranking that creates better incentives. Even
though the rankings do some injury to their schools, it is not in the interest of faculty
members to boycott the questionnaires because those faculty members would lose their
voice and power in the US. News process. By participating, faculty members can
improve the relative standing of schools they want to help.
46. I thank Larry Ribstein for suggesting this question to me.
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Schools participate, by submitting data requested by US. News, because they will
suffer if they do not provide the data. If a school were to boycott US. News, it would
diminish the authority of the US. News rankings by a small margin, and that small
decrease in the power of US. News would create a corresponding increase in autonomy
for law schools. However, that freedom would be spread across many schools, while
the costs of rebuffing US. News, including the possibility of being excluded from the
rankings, would be focused mostly on the boycotting school. Fear of exclusion, not
confidence in the legitimacy of US. News as an evaluator, keeps schools sending data.
Moreover, the costs of US. News do not fall primarily on the schools or teachers. It
is the students, more than the academic organizations, that suffer when the curriculum
is aimed at lifting all students over the bar exam instead of presenting lessons tailored
to the particular needs of the students or when scarce financial resources are spent on
advertising to improve reputations among academics. It is clients and citizens who
suffer when teachers teach to the test because that distortion of the educational process
produces lawyers less capable than they would have been if the school had focused on
students' educational needs rather than the bar exam. For these reasons, law schools
and faculty members cannot be counted on to withhold data or in any other way
boycott ranking providers in order to keep them from employing harmful criteria.
B. Students as Purchasers of Rankings
The very act of paying attention to US. News's rankings increases US. News's
influence on law school behavior. If so, why do prospective law students do it? One
possibility, of course, is that students understand the harms but see the benefits of the
information as worth its costs. But that is not the only explanation. It is possible that
they simply do not appreciate the ways in which their attention to US. News causes
schools to change their curriculum for the worse. It is also possible that the harms from
student attention are delayed, and hence fall on later students, while the benefits of the
ranking information are immediate. For example, by the time the applicant chooses her
school, US. News's inclusion of the 25th percentile or median in the calculations has
already influenced the makeup of that student's entering class, and ignoring the
rankings cannot undo that harm. A third possibility is that the harms fall on other
persons outside law school. To see this, suppose there were two rankings, one that
included the 25th percentile or median LSAT and UGPA and another new one that did
not. Many applicants would choose the slightly more informative older ranking rather
than switching to the newer ranking that benefits future clients by allowing schools to
deliver a higher quality of legal education. For these reasons, even if prospective
students recognize that the net harm caused by some U.S. News criterion exceeds its
net benefit, it might not be in the interest of any individual to shift his magazine-
purchasing dollar to the supplier of the greater social good. US. News or other
suppliers will produce what readers are willing to buy. Prospective students, as direct
purchasers, could demand rankings that create better incentives. But there is no
guarantee they will do so when the benefits of those incentives accrue to others.
C. Will Employers Demand Better Rankings?
In some ways there is more hope that employers will demand better rankings since
they are more closely connected to the clients' interests in good lawyering. However,
as with the students and schools, the clients' interests are not the same as society's
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interest. First, of course, in many situations, there are social interests not represented
by any client. Second, if, at the same cost of education, all lawyers are better educated
and therefore better able to serve their clients, it is not clear that the lawyers can
capture all of that improvement in the form of higher fees. To the extent lawyers cannot
do so, employers have an incomplete interest in improving the quality of legal
education.
VI. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
A. Ignore U.S. News
Many harms traceable to US. News's rankings result from schools' attempts to raise
their ranks. Some legal academics, including deans, have stated that schools should
simply ignore US. News and do what they think is right, whether that be in admissions,
placement, or curriculum development. They are right, of course, that this would
improve legal education. They are wrong, however, to suggest that there is any chance
it will happen on a scale large enough to make a difference. All schools might prefer
that there be no US. Nevs rankings, or that certain criteria be excluded, or that all
schools ignore the incentives created by US. News, but no school can opt out of the
game. Refusing to play-refusing to allow the LSAT to drive admissions, refusing to
allow bar passage to drive pedagogical choices, refusing to spend extra money on
career services offices and advertising-means other schools that do play the game will
pull ahead in the rankings. If that happens, some prospective students will not apply,
47
a few students will transfer out, a few faculty "prospects" will refuse interview
invitations, a faculty member or two might leave, and perhaps alumni and state
governments will provide less support. Any of these could lead to a further drop in
rank and another cycle of negative consequences for the school. Because of this
possibility, refusing to play the game is not a viable option.
Officials have tried in the past to reduce the impact of US. News. The American
Bar Association stopped collecting the median LSAT. 48 The Association of American
Law Schools hired statisticians to analyze the US. News results and investigate their
method. The deans of law schools collectively tried to discourage students from relying
on the US. News rankings.49 But these efforts had little effect, and law schools might
be worried that more serious efforts at coordination would violate the antitrust laws.
Individual faculty members are caught in the same dilemma. Their professional
lives might improve somewhat without US. News, but as long as it publishes law
rankings, they will pay heed in one way or another. If a law graduate is choosing a
school at which to teach, she will likely care about whether her articles will place well.
Because some student law review editors consider the author's institution's rank in
US. News, it is in a prospective employee's best interest to pay some attention to the
rankings when choosing employers.
US. News has set up a game. The players are the schools being ranked and the
faculty members at those schools. Most faculty members and administrators seek to
47. I intend to study whether applications increase after rankings increase.
48. Ironically, this effort might have resulted in schools placing more emphasis on the
LSAT by shifting US. News from the median LSAT to the 25th percentile. See supra Part I.B.
49. DEANS SPEAK OUT, supra note 26.
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increase their school's rank by various strategic moves. These moves are costly, in
terms of money and other resources, but do little or nothing to improve legal education
for students. Indeed, it is worse than that. Many of the strategies run contrary to the
interests of students and society. Unfortunately, the players cannot exit the game for
fear of losing support. This ranking game allows no exit and has no time clock.
B. Ranking the Rankings
It is possible for better rankings to be constructed, and it is possible for legal
professionals to help them gain credibility. One way, perhaps, to loosen the grip of
US. News on the law school ranking market is to provide information about the harms
of the various rankings. Another is to help students and others evaluate which of the
rankings provides the best information. There is just as much need for information
about whether U.S. News is providing useful information as there is need for the
information it attempts to provide. Nonetheless, there may always remain a tension
between the predictive validity of a ranking system and the negative incentives it
creates. UGPA 25th percentiles serve as an example. A good case can be made that
including them in the rankings provides a more accurate picture of the schools. On the
other hand, including 25th percentiles in the rankings creates incentives that can only
lead admissions committees away from offering admission to the best-qualified
applicants. Thus, if rankings are rated on their immediate utility to law students
choosing a school, students will ignore many of the problematic incentives created by
those rankings. If, because of bad incentives created by the criteria, a meta-ranking
gives a low rank to a ranking that is good at informing applicants, the meta-ranking
will lose credibility. The same problem that exists at the level of students choosing
schools occurs at the level of rankers ranking rankings.
CONCLUSION
Students looking for law schools and employers seeking employees need useful
information about the various products offered by legal educators. Publication of
relevant information is a service to them. But rankings are not mere information, they
add opinions based on that information. US. News's addition of opinion is hard to
justify since US. News is no expert in weighting the criteria and since the addition of
that opinion in the form of rankings has a number of negative consequences. Given the
various costs of rankings, those who publish rankings ought to try to anticipate those
consequences and ought also to do what they can to mitigate them. Rankings will not
stop, given a market willing to pay so much for them. But perhaps newcomers will
publish rankings based on criteria that more accurately reflect the quality of training
offered, or create fewer harmful incentives, or both.
Better rankings might improve the lives of those providing legal education.
However, the greater concern is about how the rankings affect the lives of others. US.
News's rankings have changed and will continue to change legal education. Those
changes will be felt directly by the students and indirectly by society. Lawyers and law
professors have a strong impact on the economy, the political system, and ethics.
Whether that impact will be for the better or worse depends on who is admitted to law
school and what training they receive while they are there. It also depends on whether
law school faculties are engaged in the sorts of research and service activities that can
lead to a more just and efficient legal system, activities that are far outside the
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incentives created by U.S. News. There are deep national interests in what happens in
law schools. The nation should therefore be concerned about the changes being
wrought in the quest for higher ranks. It is time to move beyond trying to devise a
single scale for deciding whether one law school is better than another. It is time to
imagine improvements in the law, lawyers, and the system that produces new law and
lawyers, and with that in mind to ask how rankings of law schools might be used to
achieve those improvements.
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Adjusted Number of
r, observations
.044 1026
Appendix. Regressions
Regression Dependant Independent 0 P-value
variable variable
I Grades, 75th Year T 0.022 .001*
percentile
Grades, 25th 0.029 .001"
percentile
LSAT, 75th 0.220 .004
percentile
LSAT, 25th 0.467 .001*
percentile
LSAT P75 - -0.247 .001*
LSAT P25
2 Academic rank Academic rank 0.979 .001*
in year T+ I in year T
US. News score -0.027 .029
in year T
3 Academic rank Academic rank 0.972 .001 *
in year T+1 in year T
US. News score -0.075 .001
in year T
26 Interactive only 2
variables significal
13 years x both at .05
of above
4 Academic rank Academic rank 0.052 .001*
in year T minus in year T minus
academic rank US. News rank
in year T+1 in year T
Same as above 0.102 .001"
T+1<1998
Same as above 0.028 .114
T+1>1997
5 Lawyer rank in Lawyer rank in 0.267 .001"
year Tminus year Tminus
lawyer rank in US. News rank
year T+l in year T
Same as above 0.090 .002
T+1<1998
Same as above 0.335 .001*
T+1>1997
6 LSAT75 rank LSAT75 rank in 0.260 .001*
in year T minus year T minus
LSAT75 rank US. News rank
in year T+1 in year T
7 LSAT50 rank LSAT50 rank in 0.281 .001*
in year T minus year T minus
LSAT50 rank US. News rank
in year T+1 in year T
.022 656
.100 247
.004 409
.146 656
.166 247
nt
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14 Academic rank
in year Tminus
academic rank
in year T+I
15 Lawyer rank in
year T minus
lawyer rank in
year T+1
Independent P P-value Adjusted Number of
variable r observations
LSAT25 rank in 0.106 .005 .019 359
Regression Dependant
variable
8 LSAT25 rank
in year T minus
LSAT25 rank
in year T+I
9 UGPA75 rank
in year T minus
UGPA75 rank
in year T+1
10 UGPA25 rank
in year T minus
UGPA25 rank
in year T+I
11 Academic rank
in year T minus
academic rank
in year T+1
(top 17 schools
only)
12 Academic rank
in year Tminus
academic rank
in year T+l
(schools below
Top 17)
13 Academic rank
in year T minus
academic rank
in year T+l
0.245
0.113 .001 .030 308
year T minus
US. News rank
in year T
UGPA75 rank in
year T minus
U.S. News rank
in year T
UGPA25 rank in
year T minus
U.S. News rank
in year T
Academic rank
in year T minus
U.S. News rank
in year T (top 17
schools only)
Academic rank
in year T minus
U.S. News rank
in year T
(schools below
Top 17)
Academic rank
in year T minus
U.S. News rank
in year T
Variable above
interacted with
dummy variable
for early years
Academic rank
in year T minus
U.S. News rank
in year T
Variable above
interacted with
top 17 in 1990
US. News
Lawyer rank in
year T minus
US. News rank
in year T
Variable above
interacted with
dummy variable
for early years
.103 238
0.045 .004 .017
0.026 .105 .031 656
0.075 .007
0.045 .001 .028
0.145 .021
0.334 .001*
-0.241 .001*
.169 656
NOTE:* denotes P-value rounded up to .001 from a lower value.
0.200 .001*
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